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A B S T R A C T
Background: Sense of agency is the experience of being in control of one’s own actions and their con-
sequences. The role of frontal cortex in this aspect of action control and awareness remains unclear.
Objective/hypothesis: Given the role of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in action selection, we pre-
dicted that DLPFC may contribute to sense of agency when participants select between multiple actions.
Methods: We performed a series of experiments by manipulating a range of task parameters related to
action selection and action outcomes while participants were exposed to tDCS stimulation of the left
DLPFC. We measured the temporal association between a voluntary action and its outcome using the
intentional binding effect, as an implicit measure of sense of agency.
Results: Fixed-effect meta-analysis of our primary data showed a trend towards a frontal tDCS, together
with considerable heterogeneity between our experiments. Classifying the experiments into subsets of
studies, according to whether participants endogenously selected between alternative actions or not, ex-
plained 71% of this heterogeneity. Anodal stimulation of DLPFC increased the temporal binding of actions
towards tones in the subset of studies involving endogenous action selection, but not in the other studies.
Conclusions: DLPFCmay contribute to sense of agencywhen participants selected betweenmultiple actions.
This enhanced feeling of control over voluntary actions could be related to the observed therapeutic effects
of frontal tDCS in depression.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Introduction
Performing a voluntary action that produces an intended outcome
is accompanied by a characteristic subjective experience, referred
to as ‘sense of agency’. Sense of agency is a fundamental feature of
normal human mental life [1]. Indeed, many neurological and psy-
chiatric disorders involve deﬁcits in sense of agency [2], most notably
the positive symptoms of schizophrenia [3].
The neural basis of the sense of agency is poorly understood. Pre-
vious neuroimaging studies used explicit agency attribution tasks.
Farrer and colleagues found activation of angular gyrus (AG) for
reduced or absent sense of agency [4–6] using such paradigms.
However, experiences of agency occur even when no explicit
judgement occurs [7]. The perceived temporal interval between a
voluntary action and sensory outcome is a potential implicit measure
of this experience [8,9]. The perceived times of voluntary actions
and their outcomes are attracted toward each other, compared to
both involuntary movements, and for sensory events not involv-
ing voluntary action [10].
Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) is a form of non-
invasive brain stimulation that delivers weak electric current to the
brain. It is known to modify the neuronal excitability of the tar-
geted brain region. Notably, anodal stimulation of primary motor
cortex increases corticospinal excitability, while cathodal stimula-
tion decreases it [11]. We recently investigated the contributions
of parietal and frontal areas to sense of agency [12] by combining
tDCS and intentional binding. Anodal stimulation of the left AG
reduced intentional binding, in three separate experiments. We sug-
gested that AG may generate experience of agency by monitoring
the linkage of actions to outcomes. However, the possible role of
frontal cortex is less clear. In one experiment, we found that anodal
stimulation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) had amuch
weaker effect on intentional binding.
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DLPFC has been identiﬁed as key area in selection and moni-
toring of voluntary action [13,14]. Previous studies of intentional
binding focused primarily on medial frontal cortex (MFC) [15,16].
The division of labour between these two centres in voluntary action
remains unclear, but the DLPFC may be related to selection [17],
while the MFC related to the ‘urge’ or motivation to act [18].
Here we focused on tDCS of the DLPFC. Given the previous ev-
idence, we predicted that DLPFC may contribute to sense of agency
when participants select between multiple actions. We designed
several independent experiments to test whether DLPFC tDCS would
alter intentional binding in the context of: endogenously selected
actions with different outcome identities (Exp. 1), endogenously se-
lected actions converging on the same outcome identity (Exp. 2),
rule-based endogenously selected actions with different outcome
identities (Exp. 3), endogenously selected actions with different
outcome values (Exp. 4), exogenously-instructed actions converg-
ing on a single outcome (Exp. 5), and endogenously selected actions
with uncertain outcomes (Exp. 6). For purposes of meta-analysis,
we also included our previously-published result [11], involving en-
dogenous initiation of a single action, producing a single outcome,
in which we refer to as dataset 7.
We predicted that left DLPFC tDCS would modulate intentional
binding relative to a sham control condition. The overall aim of the
series of experiments was to identify if and how the DLPFC might
contribute to agency by investigating a speciﬁc experimental con-
dition in each experiment.
Material and methods
Participants
In total 100 healthy volunteers, aged 18–35 years of age, were
recruited from the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience subject data
pool for six separate experiments. No other experiment was per-
formed involving these conditions or measures. All participants were
right handed, had normal or corrected to normal vision, had no
history or family history of seizure, epilepsy or any neurologic or
psychiatric disorder and did not have anymetallic or electronic object
in the head. Participants aﬃrmed that they had not participated in
any other brain stimulation experiment in the last 48 h, nor had con-
sumed alcohol in the last 24 h. Experimental design and procedure
were approved by the UCL research ethics committee and fol-
lowed the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki.
Behavioural task
The intentional binding paradigmwas used as an implicit measure
of sense of agency across our experiments [8]. Brieﬂy, in each ex-
perimental session, participants looked at a clock hand rotating on
a computer screen (viewing distance: 60 cm). The initial clock po-
sition was random. Clock rotation was initiated by participants
pressing the return key on a keyboard. Each full rotation lasted
2560 ms. Participants were instructed to look at the centre of the
clock and to make time judgement according to the condition. Each
condition was presented in a separate and randomised block. Brief
instructions were displayed on the screen before each condition. In
the two action conditions, participants had to press a key on the
keyboard at a time of their own free choice. This key press either
produced a tone after 250ms (operant action) or produced no sensory
outcome (baseline action). The clock hand stopped after 1500–
2500 ms (at random), and participants then judged the clock hand
position at the time of their key press, entering their response on
the keyboard. For the baseline tone condition, participants were in-
structed to look at the clock but not to press any key. While the clock
was rotating, a pure tone (based on the experiment) was played over
a loudspeaker, 1750–4000ms (at random) after the onset of the trial.
Participants were then asked to judge the clock hand position at
the time of the tone. Finally, the operant tone condition was similar
to the operant action condition, with the difference that partici-
pants had to judge the clock hand position at the time of the tone
and not the key press. All four conditions were done by all partici-
pants, except experiments 1 and 6, which only involved action
binding, and so tested only baseline action and operant action
conditions.
This common basic design was modiﬁed according to the spe-
ciﬁc requirements of each experiment (Table 1; see also
supplementary material).
tDCS procedure
Direct current stimulation was delivered by StarStim noninva-
sive wireless neurostimulator (Neuroelectrics, Barcelona, Spain).
Circular rubber electrodes (25 cm2) were covered in saline-soaked
sponges, installed in a neoprene cap, and connected to a
Neuroelectrics Instrument Controller (NIC v1.2). Current strength
was set at 1 mA in all experiments, generating a current density of
.04mA/cm2 at the scalp surface. A common tDCS montage was used
for all six experiments. For anodal stimulation of the left DLPFC,
anodal electrode was placed on F3 (according to the 10/20 inter-
national EEG electrode placement) and cathodal electrode on right
supraorbital area. This arrangement was reversed for the cathodal
stimulation of left DLPFC. For sham stimulation the anode or cathode
were randomly placed at F3.
For experiments 2–5, all participants underwent anode and sham
stimulation in separate sessions. An additional session of cathodal
stimulation was added to experiments 1 and 6 (Table 1). The order
of the sessions was randomised and counterbalanced across par-
ticipants. To minimise any potential carry-over effect, there was at
least 48 hr gap between each stimulation session [19]. Stimula-
tion in each session lasted 25 minutes, including 30 s to ramp-up
and down the stimulating current. For the sham condition, elec-
trical current was only applied during the ﬁrst and last 30 s of the
stimulation, so as to induce the same cutaneous sensation as real
stimulation, and thus blind the participants as to stimulation con-
dition. During the ﬁrst 5 minutes of stimulation, participants sat
relaxed with eyes closed. This delay was designed to allow poten-
tial neuro-modulatory effects to build up [20]. Next, participants
began the behavioural task while stimulation continued. All par-
ticipants ﬁnished the behavioural task within around 20 min,
coincident with the end of stimulation. In case participants ﬁn-
ished the task prior to the end of stimulation, they were asked to
remain seated until the end of the stimulation. In case the task out-
lasted the stimulation, they continued to perform the task without
further stimulation. The task period never exceeded the stimula-
tion period by more than 2 min. No adverse effect of stimulation
was reported by the participants other than mild tingling sensation.
Data analysis
For each condition a judgement error was calculated as the dif-
ference between judged and actual clock time. The averaged
judgement error across trials was then calculated for each condi-
tion. ‘Action binding’ was deﬁned as the difference between themean
judgement error in the operant action and the baseline action con-
ditions. A positive value represents perceptual shift of the action
towards its outcome. ‘Tone binding’ was deﬁned as the difference
between the judgement error in operant tone and baseline tone con-
ditions. A negative value of tone binding represents the perceptual
shift of outcome towards its action.
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Table 1
Experimental designs, tDCS montage and dependent variables of experiments 1–6 and dataset 7.
Experiment Design tDCS montage
conditions
Dependent
variables
Exp. 1
Endogenously selected
actions
Different outcome
identities
Anode
Cathode
Sham
Action binding
Exp. 2
Endogenously selected
actions
Same outcome identity
Anode
Sham
Action binding
Tone binding
Exp. 3
Rule-based
endogenously selected
actions
Different outcome
identities
Anode
Sham
Action binding
Tone binding
Exp. 4
Endogenously selected
actions
Different outcome
values
Anode
Sham
Action binding
Tone binding
Exp. 5
Exogenously selected
actions
Same outcome identity
Anode
Sham
Action binding
Tone binding
Exp. 6
Endogenously selected
actions
Uncertain outcomes
Anode
Cathode
Sham
Action binding
Dataset 7
Fixed action
Fixed outcome
Anode
Sham
Action binding
Tone binding
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One-way repeated measure ANOVA and paired-samples t-test
were used for comparisons within each experiment (anode and/
or cathode vs. sham).
We used two statistical methods to investigate commonality
across experiments. First, we performed meta-analyses using both
ﬁxed effects and random effects models [21]. The analysis fol-
lowed the steps described by Lipsey andWilson [22] and made use
of freely-available software for plotting [23]. Effect sizes were cal-
culated using Cohen’s dav, with Hedges’ correction for sample size
biases (Hedges’s gav) [24]. This measure is recommended for within-
subjects designs, because of its ready compatibility with other more
familiar between-subject effect size measures, and because alter-
native effect size measures such as grm can be overconservative when
observations are highly correlated across conditions [24]. To inves-
tigate the heterogeneity between our experiments, we both
calculated the Cochran’sQ test statistic, andwe also quantiﬁed degree
of inconsistency using the established I2 measure [25].
Finally, we also pooled data across experiments and used amixed
design ANOVAwith the within subject factor of stimulation and the
between subject ﬁxed-effect factor of experiment.
Results
The overall picture emerging from individual experiments is
complex, with some experiments producing a signiﬁcant result, and
others not. The individual results are presented in supplementary
material and are summarised in Table 2. The experiments were not
direct replications, since the behavioural paradigms and stimula-
tion conditions included varied between experiments. However,
anodal and sham stimulation of the left DLPFC were common con-
ditions, and action binding was a common dependent variable, in
all seven experiments. We did not perform any other experiments
involving these conditions and measures. Therefore, we had a large
dataset, free from publication bias, in which we could investigate
the following series of research questions:
1. Is there an overall effect of DLPFC tDCS on action binding?
2. Is there heterogeneity between our experiments that cannot be
explained by chance alone?
3. If there is heterogeneity, is there a plausible classiﬁcation of the
experiments into subsets of studies that can explain the
heterogeneity?
4. Is there a signiﬁcant effect of frontal tDCS within each such
subset?
Meta-analysis of laboratory interventions are rare [26,27] and
have received less statistical attention than clinical trials – a point
to which we will return in the discussion.
Twomethodological points about our meta-analysis require spe-
ciﬁc mention. First, we performed both ﬁxed-effects and random-
effects analyses. Whether ﬁxed or random-effects analyses are more
appropriate remains controversial and has not been systematical-
ly explored for laboratory experiments, particularly for cases where
heterogeneity between subsets of studies may be present [26,28].
We return to this point in discussion.
Second, meta-analyses are much more common for between-
subject designs than for within-subject designs, reﬂecting the
traditional association betweenmeta-analysis and clinical trials. The
effect size for a within-subject design can be calculated from
the difference scores between the two conditions of interest, whereas
the effect size for between-subject designs is based on estimates
of variability in each of the two conditions. Meta-analyses of within-
subject studies often report effect sizes based on between-subject
effect sizes [24,26], for comparability with other meta-analyses, and
because information about variability of difference scores is rarely
given explicitly in published reports of within-subjects designs. If
the variability in each condition of a within-subjects design is largely
due to factors common to all conditions, such as individual differ-
ences in personality, task performance etc., then the variability of
difference scores may be substantially lower than the pooled vari-
ance of each experimental condition. In that case, using a between-
subject method of calculating error variance would underestimate
the true within-subject effect size. We have used a measure of effect
size that has been recommended for within-subjects designs, and
uses the average standard deviation of both conditions [24].
The results of the meta-analysis are summarised in Table 3. Re-
garding our ﬁrst question of overall effect size, we found a near-
signiﬁcant overall effect of frontal tDCS when using ﬁxed effects, but
Table 2
Experimental results of experiments 1–6 and dataset 7.
Experiment The effect of anodal stimulation on action
binding compared to sham
Exp. 1
Endogenously selected
actions
Different outcome identities
No signiﬁcant
effect
t(15) = 1.27, p = 0.22,
gav = 0.31
Exp. 2
Endogenously selected
actions
Same outcome identity
Signiﬁcant increase t(15) = 2.55, p = 0.02,
gav = 0.81
Exp. 3
Rule-based endogenously
selected actions
Different outcome identities
Signiﬁcant increase t(15) = 2.21, p = 0.04,
gav = 0.95
Exp. 4
Endogenously selected
actions
Different outcome values
No signiﬁcant
effect
t(15) = 1.11, p = 0.28,
gav = 0.19
Exp. 5
Exogenously selected actions
Same outcome identity
No signiﬁcant
effect
t(15) = 0.48, p = 0.63,
gav = 0.16
Exp. 6
Endogenously selected
actions
Uncertain outcomes
No signiﬁcant
effect
t(17) = −0.24, p = 0.81,
gav = −0.07
Dataset 7
Fixed action
Fixed outcome
No signiﬁcant
effect
t(15) = −1.26, p = 0.22,
gav = −0.42
Table 3
Meta-analysis of the experimental results, presented separately for ﬁxed and random
effect models. Signiﬁcant results are presented in bold.
Research question Analysis model Effect size/test statistic
Is there an overall effect of
stimulation?
Fixed effects Mean (se) gav = 0.25 (0.13)
z-test = 1.84, p = 0.06
95% CI = [−0.02 0.51]
Random effects Mean (se) gav = 0.26 (0.18)
z-test = 1.45, p = 0.15
95% CI = [−0.09 0.61]
Is there heterogeneity
among experiments?
Fixed effects I2 = 44% (moderate
heterogeneity)
QTotal (6) = 10.66, p < 0.1
Random effects I2 = 1% (negligible
heterogeneity)
QTotal (6) = 6.05, p > 0.1
Is there a convincing
subset of studies where
an effect is present?
Grouping based on action
selection
Fixed effects I2Between = 71% (high
heterogeneity)
QBetween (1) = 3.47, p < 0.1
Random effects I2Between = 50% (moderate
heterogeneity)
QBetween (1) = 2.00, p > 0.1
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not random effects analysis. Thus, we found a trend for frontal tDCS
to inﬂuence our measure of sense of agency.
Regarding our second research question of heterogeneity, we used
the established I2 measure to estimate the variability among effect
sizes that could not be explained by chance. This amounted to 44%
(moderate heterogeneity [25]) under the ﬁxed effects model. Because
we purposely designed the experiments with different behavioural
paradigms, some heterogeneity is expected a priori. Nevertheless,
we also applied the conventional Cochrane’s Q test, and con-
ﬁrmed presence of heterogeneity under the ﬁxed effects model, but
not the random effects model. Note that we used the recom-
mended signiﬁcance level of 0.1 for the Q test, rather than the
conventional 0.05, given the acknowledgedly conservative nature
of the test [29].
Where heterogeneity exists, the Q test can also be used to iden-
tify potential subsets of studies that have a common pattern of
results, since heterogeneity should be high between subsets, but low
within. Based on previous literature [17], we hypothesised that DLPFC
stimulation might inﬂuence action binding differently when par-
ticipants themselves select between alternative actions (experiments
1, 2, 3, 4, 6), compared to when they did not (experiment 5, dataset
7). This subsetting of studies explained a high (71%) proportion of
the variability between experiments and revealed a signiﬁcant dif-
ference between experiments with and without endogenous action
selection (Table 3 and Fig. 1). Importantly, within the action selec-
tion subset, we found a highly signiﬁcant effect of stimulation (mean
(se) gav = 0.41(0.16), z-test = 2.56, p = 0.01, 95% CI = [0.10 0.72]) with
low and non-signiﬁcant heterogeneity (I2Subset = 31%,QSubsetTotal (4) = 5.79,
p > 0.1). In the subset of experiments lacking action selection, we
found no effect of stimulation (mean (se) gav = −0.14(0.25),
z-test = −0.57, p = 0.57, 95% CI = [−0.63 0.35]).
Unusually for a meta-analysis, we had ready access to the orig-
inal data, not just effect sizes. We therefore also conducted a mixed
effects ANOVA across the 114 participants, using a within-subject
factor of the stimulation (anode vs. sham) and a between-subject
factor of experiment (7 levels, Exp. 1–6 + dataset 7), with experi-
ment as a ﬁxed effect. We found no signiﬁcant main effect of
experiment (F(6,107) = 0.88, p = 0.51, η2 = 0.05), but a signiﬁcant
overall increase in action binding with stimulation (F(1,107) = 5.13,
p = 0.03, η2 = 0.05), and a signiﬁcant interaction between the stim-
ulation and experiment (F(6,107) = 3.09, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.15) (Fig. 2).
We conducted a further ANOVA, collecting the experiments into
the subsets of studies identiﬁed by meta-analysis. This showed no
signiﬁcant main effect of stimulation (F(1,112) = 1.06, p = 0.30,
η2 = 0.01) nor of subsets (F(1,112) = 0.48, p = 0.50, η2 < 0.01), but a
signiﬁcant interaction between the stimulation and the subsets
(F(1,112) = 4.10, p = 0.04, η2 = 0.04). Anodal stimulation increased
action binding within the endogenous action-selection subset of
studies (t(81) = 2.93, p < 0.01, gav = 0.47), but not in the other subset
(t(31) = −0.56, p = 0.58, gav = −0.13).
Figure 1. Forest plot comparing subsets of studies with and without endogenous action selection.
Figure 2. The effect of anodal stimulation of the left DLPFC on action binding in each
of seven studies. Error bars show standard error of the mean. *p < .05.
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Discussion
Effect of anodal stimulation of DLPFC on action binding: a meta-
analytic approach
DLPFC is routinely activated in studies of human voluntary action
[13], particularly when a strong action selection component is
present [17]. Moreover, a recent study involving explicit agency
judgement found that when action selection was facilitated by com-
patible primes, the DLPFC inﬂuenced sense of agency over outcomes,
through its connectivity with angular gyrus [30]. Our previous
neurostimulation experiment found some evidence in support of
the involvement of lateral frontal areas in sense of agency [12].
However, that task lacked any action selection component. To further
explore the contribution of DLPFC to sense of agency, we per-
formed a series of tDCS experiments, altering task parameters related
to action selection and action outcome, and measuring the tem-
poral association between a voluntary action and its outcome, as
an implicit measure of sense of agency.
In a series of experiments, participants were asked to endog-
enously select an action from two action alternatives. Actions were
then followed by a sensory outcome (tone) of different identities
(Exp. 1 and 3), same identity (Exp. 2), different outcome values (Exp.
4), or uncertain outcomes (Exp. 6). In other experiments, partici-
pants were explicitly told which action to choose (Exp. 5) or had
no alternatives (dataset 7). Primary analysis of individual experi-
ments showed that anodal stimulation of the left DLPFC sometimes
increased action binding but sometimes did not. We then usedmeta-
analysis to investigate the results across the several experiments.
Fixed effects meta-analysis conﬁrmed moderate heterogeneity
among studies. Classifying studies into subsets, according to pres-
ence or absence of endogenous action selection, explained 71% of
the variability across the experiments. Within the subset of experi-
ments involving action selection, anodal tDCS signiﬁcantly increased
action binding compared to sham. We conclude that anodal stim-
ulation may have a modest (mean gav = 0.41) facilitatory effect on
a component of intentional binding related to selection between al-
ternative voluntary actions. Thus, ourmeta-analysis suggests a causal
role of frontal action selection signals in prospective sense of agency.
A similar suggestion was made previously in the context of a
neuroimaging study using explicit agency judgements [30]. Our result
provides the ﬁrst evidence using neurostimulation and implicit
measures.
DLPFC, action selection, and sense of agency
Few causal studies have investigated the neural correlates of
agency and those focused primarily on medial frontal cortex. Direct
stimulation of medial frontal cortex in neurosurgical patients can
induce an experience of volition (“urge to move”) [31]. In con-
trast, stimulation of lateral frontal cortex produced movements
without any subjective experience of urge [32], though the stim-
ulation sites were largely posterior to DLPFC.
Three studies have reported neurostimulation effects on sense
of agency over outcomes. One study combined a choice reaction-
task with single pulse TMS stimulation of the inferior parietal cortex
(IPC), or the DLPFC, or sham stimulation [33]. Participants made ex-
plicit judgements of control over action outcomes. Therewas nomain
effect of TMS on judgements of control, but stimulation of IPC at
the time of action selection reduced the inﬂuence on judgements
of compatible vs. incompatible subliminal primes preceding the in-
structional cue. The absence of any signiﬁcant effect of DLPFC TMS
may seem inconsistent with the present results. However, in that
task, the action selection was direct and exogenous. In contrast, in
our experiments, action selection always involved some endogenous
element, such as learning to identify a ‘correct’ response, or an in-
direct cue–actionmapping requiring a workingmemory component.
Two other studies focused on medial frontal areas. A cTBS virtual
lesion study of pre-supplementarymotor area (pre-SMA) was shown
to reduce effect binding, but not action binding, in a task where par-
ticipants couldmake only a single action, but chose the time at which
to do so [16]. Finally, a recent tDCS experiment [34] combined in-
tentional binding with stimulation of pre-SMA. Those authors found
reduced action binding, but not effect binding, again in a task that
lacked action selection.
Limitations
We always placed the return (cathode) electrode on the right su-
praorbital area. Although this montage is common in tDCS studies
of prefrontal areas [35], it involves a high current density close to
the right frontopolar area. Hence, we cannot completely rule out
effects of right cathodal frontopolar stimulation. However, we think
this alternative interpretation is unlikely for a number of reasons.
First, a recent review found that cathodal stimulation has only weak
effects on cognitive (as opposed to motor) measures [36]. Second,
in previous experiments focusing on the parietal contribution to
sense of agency, we found strong effects of parietal anodal stimu-
lation, both with cathode placed over the right supraorbital area or
placed elsewhere [12]. Third, an overview of studies of anodal left
DLPFC studies shows effects both with supraorbital and other cath-
odal locations, including left mastoid [37] and Cz [38]. Thus, while
we cannot strictly rule out a right frontopolar cathodal effect, we
favour an interpretation based on a left DLPFC anodal effect.
Meta-analytic methods originated in the context of clinical trials
and do not transfer straightforwardly to experimental settings. In
the ‘ideal’ clinical trial case, meta-analysis would include several
large studies all using a common intervention, on comparable popu-
lations, and with a single outcome measure. In contrast, the
neurostimulation literature typically provides many low-powered
studies. Variations in equipment, electrode placement, and exper-
imenter technique may inﬂuence effect size [39]. Finally, the
neurostimulation literature is probably strongly affected by publi-
cation bias.
Fixed effects models assume that all studies share a common true
effect size, while random effects models assume that the true effect
sizes may vary across studies [21]. Previous meta-analyses of cog-
nitive effects of tDCS argued in favour of ﬁxed-effects models [40],
on the grounds that the intervention was a uniform and precisely-
quantiﬁed intervention. In contrast, random-effects meta-analyses
are often used in systematic reviews of clinical trials to address likely
but uncontrolled variation across trials, including factors such as
differences in protocol, trial setting, etc. In our case, we varied the
details of the cognitive task, and therefore might expect our inter-
vention to have varying effects. However, our experimental designs
followed the classic logic of cognitive neuropsychology, in which
a task involves a particular combination of cognitive processes, each
implemented by a speciﬁc functional circuit within the brain, which
is targeted by tDCS. Finally, combining a ﬁxed-effects model with
heterogeneity analysis may seem paradoxical, since the former
assumes a common effect, while the latter looks for variability.
However, since themeta-analysis aims to identifying possible subsets
of studies, the assumption of a single true effect size would be war-
rantedwithin each subset. Here, we identiﬁed a subset of agency tasks
involving endogenous selection between alternatives, for which
DLPFC stimulation increased sense of agency. This result ﬁts well
with the neurocognitive theory of localisation of function [41] and
is consistent with the role for DLPFC in both action selection [17]
377N. Khalighinejad et al. / Brain Stimulation 9 (2016) 372–379
and prospective agency [30]. Other meta-analytic approaches have
also been proposed to address such research questions. In particular,
clinical trial and policy meta-analyses often favour random-
effects meta-regression, using covariates to identify heterogeneity
and possible subsets. However, these methods are not recom-
mended when fewer than ten studies are available [42].
The effect of anodal stimulation on action binding was not ob-
served in every experiment, even within the subset of studies
involving endogenous action selection. In the ﬁxed-effects statis-
tical model, the measured effects combine both the “true” effect,
and measurement error. Measurement error may thus explain why
not all individual studies showed the signiﬁcant effect found in the
subset of action selection studies. Indeed, estimating the true effect
size, independent of measurement error, is one explicit aim of meta-
analysis. Furthermore, our studies differed in other aspects, such as
outcome identity and value, in addition to the common feature of
endogenous action selection. We cannot exclude the possibility that
left anodal DLPFC stimulation might also have some inﬂuence on
other cognitive processes involved in some of the experiments – and
this could partly explain the varied effect of stimulation on action
selection subset of studies. In this vein, we also applied similar meta-
analytic analyses of heterogeneity to investigate whether stimulation
effects depended on the nature of action outcomes in our data. These
analyses did not reveal any signiﬁcant pattern in the results. However,
small additional effects, related to cognitive processes other than
action selection, might still be present in some individual
experiments.
Conclusions
We performed a series of experiments to test whether we can
interfere with sense of agency in the context of action selection by
combining frontal tDCS with an implicit measure of sense of agency
based on mental chronometry. Anodal stimulation of DLPFC in-
creased binding of actions towards outcomes, but only in tasks where
participants endogenously selected between alternative actions. One
previous behavioural study noted a relation between action selec-
tion and intentional binding [43], but the underlying neural basis
remained unclear. Our result has important implications for the sense
of agency. In particular, it seems incompatible with a strongly
reconstructionist view that people infer agency from the mere con-
junction of action execution and sensory outcomes [44]. Rather,
neural processes in DLPFC of selecting which action to make, which
necessarily precede action initiation, make a prospective contribu-
tion to sense of agency. A recent meta-analysis on the eﬃcacy of
tDCS in the treatment of depression indicated that anodal stimu-
lation of left DLPFC was superior to sham tDCS [45]. Depression and
sense of agency may be related. We speculate that clinical ben-
eﬁts in depression could be related to increased feeling that one’s
decisions and actions can make a difference – an enhanced sense
of agency. Finally, we note that the size of our effect is modest and
that no established statistical analysis plan exists for meta-analysing
laboratory intervention studies. Our approach was based on ﬁxed
effect meta-analysis and used heterogeneity analysis to identify
subsets of studies, as a means of identifying the speciﬁc cognitive
processes in DLPFC that contribute to sense of agency. We hope that
this article will trigger future methodological developments in using
meta-analysis of neurostimulation data to localise cognitive func-
tions in the human brain.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the European Research Council Ad-
vanced Grant HUMVOL (Grant number: 323943). PHwas additionally
supported by a Professorial Research Fellowship from the ESRC (grant
number ES/J023140/1). The funding sources had no involvement,
in study design; in the collection, analysis or interpretation of data;
in the writing of the report; or in the decision to submit the article
for publication. We are grateful to Prof. Chris McManus for
comments.
Appendix: Supplementary material
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at
doi:10.1016/j.brs.2016.01.005.
References
[1] Frith CD. Action, agency and responsibility. Neuropsychologia 2014;55:137–42.
doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2013.09.007.
[2] Kranick SM, Hallett M. Neurology of volition. Exp Brain Res 2013;229:313–27.
doi:10.1007/s00221-013-3399-2.
[3] Moore JW, Fletcher PC. Sense of agency in health and disease: a review of cue
integration approaches. Conscious Cogn 2012;21:59–68. doi:10.1016/
j.concog.2011.08.010.
[4] Farrer C, Frith CD. Experiencing oneself vs another person as being the cause
of an action: the neural correlates of the experience of agency. Neuroimage
2002;15:596–603. doi:10.1006/nimg.2001.1009.
[5] Farrer C, Franck N, Georgieff N, Frith CD, Decety J, Jeannerod M. Modulating
the experience of agency: a positron emission tomography study. Neuroimage
2003;18:324–33. doi:10.1016/S1053-8119(02)00041-1.
[6] Farrer C, Frey SH, Horn JDV, Tunik E, Turk D, Inati S, et al. The angular gyrus
computes action awareness representations. Cereb Cortex 2008;18:254–61.
doi:10.1093/cercor/bhm050.
[7] Synofzik M, Vosgerau G, Newen A. Beyond the comparator model: a
multifactorial two-step account of agency. Conscious Cogn 2008;17:219–39.
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2007.03.010.
[8] Haggard P, Clark S, Kalogeras J. Voluntary action and conscious awareness. Nat
Neurosci 2002;5:382–5. doi:10.1038/nn827.
[9] Moore JW, Obhi SS. Intentional binding and the sense of agency: a review.
Conscious Cogn 2012;21:546–61. doi:10.1016/j.concog.2011.12.002.
[10] Cravo AM, Claessens PME, Baldo MVC. Voluntary action and causality in
temporal binding. Exp Brain Res 2009;199:95–9. doi:10.1007/s00221-009-
1969-0.
[11] Nitsche MA, Paulus W. Excitability changes induced in the humanmotor cortex
by weak transcranial direct current stimulation. J Physiol 2000;527(Pt 3):633–9.
doi:10.1111/j.1469-7793.2000.t01-1-00633.x.
[12] Khalighinejad N, Haggard P. Modulating human sense of agency with
non-invasive brain stimulation. Cortex 2015;69:93–103. doi:10.1016/
j.cortex.2015.04.015.
[13] Jahanshahi M, Jenkins IH, Brown RG, Marsden CD, Passingham RE, Brooks DJ.
Self-initiated versus externally triggered movements. I. An investigation using
measurement of regional cerebral blood ﬂow with PET and movement-related
potentials in normal and Parkinson’s disease subjects. Brain 1995;118(Pt
4):913–33. doi:10.1093/brain/118.4.913.
[14] Rowe JB, Hughes L, Nimmo-Smith I. Action selection: a race model for selected
and non-selected actions distinguishes the contribution of premotor and
prefrontal areas. Neuroimage 2010;51:888–96. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage
.2010.02.045.
[15] Kühn S, Brass M, Haggard P. Feeling in control: neural correlates of experience
of agency. Cortex 2013;49:1935–42. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2012.09.002.
[16] Moore JW, Ruge D, Wenke D, Rothwell J, Haggard P. Disrupting the experience
of control in the human brain: pre-supplementary motor area contributes to
the sense of agency. Proc Biol Sci 2010;277:2503–9. doi:10.1098/rspb.2010.0404.
[17] Rowe JB, Toni I, Josephs O, Frackowiak RS, Passingham RE. The prefrontal cortex:
response selection or maintenance within working memory? Science
2000;288:1656–60. doi:10.1126/science.288.5471.1656.
[18] Fried I, Mukamel R, Kreiman G. Internally generated preactivation of single
neurons in humanmedial frontal cortex predicts volition. Neuron 2011;69:548–
62. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2010.11.045.
[19] Nitsche MA, Cohen LG, Wassermann EM, Priori A, Lang N, Antal A, et al.
Transcranial direct current stimulation: state of the art 2008. Brain Stimul
2008;1:206–23. doi:10.1016/j.brs.2008.06.004.
[20] Zwissler B, Sperber C, Aigeldinger S, Schindler S, Kissler J, Plewnia C. Shaping
memory accuracy by left prefrontal transcranial direct current stimulation. J
Neurosci 2014;34:4022–6. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5407-13.2014.
[21] Borenstein M, Hedges LV, Higgins JPT, Rothstein HR. Introduction to meta-
analysis. John Wiley & Sons; 2011.
[22] Lipsey MW, Wilson DB. Practical meta-analysis. SAGE Publications; 2001.
[23] Gordon M, Lumley T. Forestplot: advanced forest plot using “grid” graphics. R
package version 1.3; 2015.
[24] Lakens D. Calculating and reporting effect sizes to facilitate cumulative science:
a practical primer for t-tests and ANOVAs. Cognition 2013;4:863. doi:10.3389/
fpsyg.2013.00863.
378 N. Khalighinejad et al. / Brain Stimulation 9 (2016) 372–379
[25] Higgins JPT, Thompson SG, Deeks JJ, Altman DG. Measuring inconsistency in
meta-analyses. BMJ 2003;327:557–60. doi:10.1136/bmj.327.7414.557.
[26] Horvath JC, Forte JD, Carter O. Transcranial direct current stimulation
demonstrates little-to-no reliable or signiﬁcant effect on any cognitive/behavioral
or neurophysiologic outcome measure: a comprehensive meta-analysis. Brain
Stimul 2015;8:318–19. doi:10.1016/j.brs.2015.01.034.
[27] Horvath JC, Forte JD, Carter O. Evidence that transcranial direct current
stimulation (tDCS) generates little-to-no reliable neurophysiologic effect
beyond MEP amplitude modulation in healthy human subjects: a systematic
review. Neuropsychologia 2014;66C:213–36. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia
.2014.11.021.
[28] Hedges LV, Vevea JL. Fixed- and random-effects models inmeta-analysis. Psychol
Methods 1998;3:486–504. doi:10.1037/1082-989X.3.4.486.
[29] Higgins JPT, Green S. 9.5.2 Identifying and measuring heterogeneity n.d.,
<http://handbook.cochrane.org/chapter_9/9_5_2_identifying_and_measuring
_heterogeneity.htm>; [accessed 10.08.15].
[30] Chambon V, Wenke D, Fleming SM, Prinz W, Haggard P. An online neural
substrate for sense of agency. Cereb Cortex 2013;23:1031–7. doi:10.1093/
cercor/bhs059.
[31] Fried I, Katz A, McCarthy G, Sass KJ, Williamson P, Spencer SS, et al. Functional
organization of human supplementary motor cortex studied by electrical
stimulation. J Neurosci 1991;11:3656–66.
[32] Desmurget M, Reilly KT, Richard N, Szathmari A, Mottolese C, Sirigu A.
Movement intention after parietal cortex stimulation in humans. Science
2009;324:811–13. doi:10.1126/science.1169896.
[33] Chambon V, Moore JW, Haggard P. TMS stimulation over the inferior parietal
cortex disrupts prospective sense of agency. Brain Struct Funct
2015;220(6):3627–39. doi:10.1007/s00429-014-0878-6.
[34] Cavazzana A, Penolazzi B, Begliomini C, Bisiacchi PS. Neural underpinnings of
the “agent brain”: new evidence from transcranial direct current stimulation.
Eur J Neurosci 2015;doi:10.1111/ejn.12937.
[35] Tremblay S, Lepage J-F, Latulipe-Loiselle A, Fregni F, Pascual-Leone A, Théoret
H. The uncertain outcome of prefrontal tDCS. Brain Stimul 2014;7:773–83.
doi:10.1016/j.brs.2014.10.003.
[36] Jacobson L, KoslowskyM, Lavidor M. tDCS polarity effects in motor and cognitive
domains: a meta-analytical review. Exp Brain Res 2012;216:1–10. doi:10.1007/
s00221-011-2891-9.
[37] Zaehle T, Sandmann P, Thorne JD, Jäncke L, Herrmann CS. Transcranial direct
current stimulation of the prefrontal cortex modulates working memory
performance: combined behavioural and electrophysiological evidence. BMC
Neurosci 2011;12:2. doi:10.1186/1471-2202-12-2.
[38] Meiron O, Lavidor M. Unilateral prefrontal direct current stimulation effects are
modulated by working memory load and gender. Brain Stimul 2013;6:440–7.
doi:10.1016/j.brs.2012.05.014.
[39] Nitsche MA, Bikson M, Bestmann S. On the use of meta-analysis in
neuromodulatory non-invasive brain stimulation. Brain Stimul 2015;8:666–7.
doi:10.1016/j.brs.2015.03.008.
[40] Horvath JC, Forte JD, Carter O. Quantitative review ﬁnds no evidence of cognitive
effects in healthy populations from single-session transcranial direct current
stimulation (tDCS). Brain Stimul 2015;8:535–50. doi:10.1016/j.brs.2015.01.400.
[41] Shallice T. From neuropsychology to mental structure. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press; 1988.
[42] Higgins JPT, Green S. 9.6.4 Meta-regression n.d., <http://handbook.cochrane
.org/chapter_9/9_6_4_meta_regression.htm>; [accessed 02.01.16].
[43] Barlas Z, Obhi SS. Freedom, choice, and the sense of agency. Front HumNeurosci
2013;7:514. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00514.
[44] Wegner DM. The mind’s best trick: how we experience conscious will. Trends
Cogn Sci 2003;7:65–9.
[45] Meron D, Hedger N, Garner M, Baldwin DS. Transcranial direct current
stimulation (tDCS) in the treatment of depression: systematic review and
meta-analysis of eﬃcacy and tolerability. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2015;57:46–62.
doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2015.07.012.
379N. Khalighinejad et al. / Brain Stimulation 9 (2016) 372–379
